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RECENT REFORMS IN MEXICAN RULES ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
LIC. FRANCISCO CARRILLO GAMBOA*
A year ago, the corporate governance system in Mexico for publicly traded
companies was basically voluntary. There was a voluntary code with which a
number of companies complied. Companies that were listed on the Bolsa' had to

disclose the extent to which they were in compliance with that voluntary code of
best corporate practices. The situation has changed since then with the amendment
of the Mexican Securities Act.'
In the past year our legal environment has changed. Last year many of the
corporate governance issues were codified in a standard, so that Mexican listed
companies could voluntarily choose to perform under the code or not to do so. It
was a only a rule of level of disclosure. The market valuation of a company's equity
depended on its level of compliance with the code.
Last June Mexico had a major review of our financial law and Mexican financial
laws were amended to comply with certain international principles. In particular,
the Mexican Securities Act was amended in order to recognize the need for the
following: 1) regulation of corporate governance; 2) full, fair and prompt
disclosure; 3) minority rights, and 4) transparency of stock transactions.
One question I would raise for my U.S. colleagues is whether this is consistent
with the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 federal securities acts of the United
3
States, or whether Mexican law, as we will see, is consistent with Rule 10B5 in the
United States and the 1934 act.
CHANGES IN MEXICAN CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE

What has happened to regulation of corporate governance in Mexico? The
Mexican Securities Act now acknowledges and requires the following:
First, the Act requires the presence of independent directors and a Mexican issuer.
The law does not define "independent"; nevertheless, the law provides certain
guidelines in order to be able to determine who is a related director or whether a
director does not qualify as independent. The boards must be composed of between
five and twenty members. This is true because before, in publicly traded companies,
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1. The Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV) or Bolsa is the Mexican Stock Exchange. It is a private
institution, legally incorporated as a limited company with variable capital that operates under a concession from
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and is governed by the Securities Market Act. Its shareholders consist
exclusively of authorized brokerage firms, each of which owns a single share. See, http://www.bmv.com.mx/
bmving/generalinfo.html
2.

The Mexican Securities Act is also known as the Ley de la Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores

(Law of the National Banking and Securities Commission). The text is available at: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/
leyinfo/46/.
3. lOB-5 is a provision in U.S. federal securities law that prohibits fraudulent and misleading activities in
securities transactions.
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either we had very large boards or we had boards that were closely held, usually
with related persons that were equity holders and board members and the issuer.
Second, at least 25 percent of the board must be independent. There must also
be an alternate director for each director appointed, and companies must comply
with the same ratio of independents.
Here come the important matters. Before the law was amended, which matters
were referred to the board of directors were basically determined by the
shareholders. The regulations that are still in force only required certain major
corporate events to be approved by the board, such as divestitures of subsidiaries,
or how the equity of the subsidiary would be voted in the shareholders meeting of
a subsidiary, as well as the exercise of the withdrawal rights in a subsidiary. Today,
due to corporate governance, the board has a special duty to assure the disclosure
of extraordinary corporate transactions of the issuer. Extraordinary corporate
transactions are those that are executed between management and non-independent
directors, i.e., those directors who have an equity stake in the corporation. Other
considerations include major corporate positions and divestitures of the company
and guarantees to be issued or accepted by the company and other major
reorganization of corporate assets.
This is the first time that the Mexican Securities Act has imposed upon the
Mexican issuer a duty of care and accountability. It will be a question for the
Mexican practitioners in the corporate area, as well as the securities lawyers and trial
lawyers in Mexico, to discuss how the Securities Act, Commercial Code, and
commercial litigation should interact. This is the framework. These are the rules
of the game in connection with duty of care and accountability.
Going further in corporate governance, after the board of directors we have a new
corporate governance principle in the law that was already in the Code, and I refer
to the auditing committee. The auditing committee is now mandatory. The auditing
committee must be composed of a majority of independent directors and must be
chaired by an independent director. The functions of the auditing committee will
be set forth in the bylaws. Nevertheless, it will be one of the mandatory functions
or responsibilities of the auditing committee to be able to learn and give an opinion
in connection with related party transactions. The resolutions of the auditing
committee will have to be presented to the board of directors and then to the annual
shareholders meeting of the company. Additionally, we need to file an annual report
that has an extensive management discussion and analysis (MD & A) of the issuer,
including board compensation. Full disclosure and transparency have to do with
short selling and trading.
The other major change in Mexico is insider trading. Before the law was
amended, there were many loopholes for insider trading in Mexico. For example,
if the insider did not make any profit, one could not enforce the action. There were
no remedies. There was another loophole as to whether insider trading requested a
benefit for the insider. Today, Mexico has learned from the U.S. S.E.C. and from
the federal cases in the United States. Now we have criminal offenses that apply not
only in 1OB-5 situations but also when an insider makes an illegal disclosure. An
illegal disclosure of a material fact constitutes a criminal offense in Mexico. In my
opinion, this is beyond 1011-5, because 10B-5 requires that somebody, even in a
conspiracy charge, make a trade. In Mexico, one can still be liable for insider
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trading-even if one does not make a trade-just for the disclosure of material
information that was not disclosed by the issuer.
Another major change in Mexico is the fact that now companies can have, in the
bylaws and subject to the approval of the CNBV, poison pills approved by the
government. With these poison pills, companies can avoid unfriendly takeovers in
Mexico.
MINORITY RIGHTS

The matter of minority rights in Mexico involves contractual principles set forth
in Mexican corporate laws, such as bylaws and shareholders agreements. Based on
these principles, Mexico wants to enhance minority rights. In the Mexican
Securities Act we have made certain revisions of the rights that apply to
corporations. Such changes are the following:
For a listed company, 10 percent of equity holders can appoint a director.
Further, an inspector can be appointed with a 10-percent vote. A 10 percent equity
holder may call a shareholders meeting, provided that the shareholder complies with
the procedure set forth in the Mexican corporate law: the process goes through the
inspector or the board members. What is important is that a call for a shareholders
meeting can be requested.
Another important factor is that enforcement of an action to impose liability
against directors-that is, an action for accountability-is now based on a
15 percent ownership. Holders of 15 percent can bring directive actions against the
board. Information and deferral of corporate decisions requires 10 percent. Other
claims to enjoin actions of the shareholders require 20 percent. This is an
improvement. In certain cases, we have moved from a 33 percent requirement to a
requirement of 10 percent.
The next step is to complete the legal framework. We have disclosure, criminal
sanctions for insider trading, an increase in minority rights. Perhaps the next step
would be to improve Mexican law in order to be able to enforce registration rights
that you have under stockholder agreements.

